Protect the workspace
Contain where a tool can send data
Limit each integration to the destinations it declares, so a compromised tool has nowhere to send your data.
Give each tool an explicit destination allowlist and refuse every destination it did not declare.
What this changes for your team.
Outbound traffic from a shipped integration passes through one door that enforces the tool's own declaration. A tool that declares no destination gets no outbound capability at all, hosts match exactly or by verified suffix, and the resolved address is tested against private and reserved ranges before the request leaves - so a public hostname aimed at an internal or metadata address is refused rather than fetched.
How it works in practice.
- 01
Declare the destinations a tool may reach as part of the tool itself.
- 02
Resolve and check the target address against private and reserved ranges before dispatch.
- 03
Refuse an undeclared host, and re-run every check from the start rather than letting a redirect inherit clearance.
What you can plan around.
The behaviour you can design against, stated concretely.
A tool with no declared destination has no outbound capability; omission is refusal rather than permission.
Where a vendor SDK cannot use the shared door, that integration reproduces the same address guard and the exception list is pinned by an automated check.
Attempts are recorded by destination - hostname and dialed address, never path or query.
Selected integrations receive a placeholder instead of their own secret, with the real value substituted only after the destination checks pass.
Bring one real process
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